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In the 
Supreme Court of the State of Utah 
THE DENVER AND RIO GRANDE 
WESTERN RAILROAD COMPANY, 
a corporation, et al., 
Respondents, 
vs. 
CENTRAL WEBER SEWER IM-
PROVEMENT DISTRICT, a munic-
ipal corporation; LYMAN M. HESS, 
ARTHUR P. BROWN, ELMER 
CARVER, constituting the Board of 
County Commissioners of Weber 
County, a municipal corporation; and 
LYMAN M. HESS, ARTHUR P. 
BROWN and ELMER CARVER, 
County Commissioners of Weber 
County, a municipal corporation, 
Appellants. 
Case Nos. 
8171, 8172, 
8173, 8174, 
8175,8176 
RESPONDENTS' BRIEF 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Respondents concur generally with the statement of 
facts as set forth in the brief of appellants. However, by 
concurring, respondents do not, of course, stipulate that the 
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2 
facts as stated by the appellants constitute all of the relev-
ant facts in this matter. In this connection it should be 
brought to the attention of the court here that appellants' 
brief fails to set forth the properties of all respondents in 
the stipulations which appellants set forth in their state-
ment of facts, and that the properties which respondents 
Union Pacific Railroad Company, Oregon Short Line Rail-
road Company, and Union Railway and Depot Company 
seek to have eliminated from the district are set forth in 
detail in the stipulations of fact with respect to those re-
spondents on file therein. 
The attention of the court is invted to the fact that al-
though appellants have made eight assignments of error in 
the case, they have grouped said assignments for purpose 
of argument into three main points. Respondents will treat 
these and other points in this brief. 
STATEMENT OF POINTS 
1. The District Court properly received in evidence 
stipulations of the parties as to the material facts. in this 
case. 
2. The District Court properly eliminated from the 
district the properties of respondents which will not be 
directly benefited by the proposed improvements. 
A. The statutory requirements of elimina-
tion, upon protest, of property which will not be 
directly benefited by the proposed improvements, 
is not limited to the elimination of real property. 
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B. The Trial Court propertly considered the 
phrase "directly benefited" as that phrase ap-
pears in the 1951 act, and properly denied ap-
pellants motion to strike the word "directly" from 
respondents pleadings. 
C. The finding of the District Court that the 
property will not be directly benefited by the pro-
posed improvements is supported by the undis-
puted evidence. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE DISTRICT COURT PROPERLY RECEIV-
ED IN EVIDENCE STIPULATIONS OF THE 
PARTIES AS TO THE MATERIAL FACTS IN 
THIS CASE. 
The primary question to be considered here is whether 
or not plaintiffs and respondents will have received due 
process of law if appellants prevail in their contention that 
the hearing in district court is legally limited to purely a 
review of the proceedings held before the Board of County 
Commissioners. That the requirements of due process must 
be met is conceded by appellants who, on page 29 of their 
brief, allege that the requirements of due process will have 
been met if this court agrees with their contentions. In 
support of their arguments, appellants cite merely "Laws of 
Utah, 1951," Chapter 32, Section 3 and Rule 65 (B) (b) 
(e)-Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. They dismiss the en-
tire matter of due process with a vague citation to Tygeson 
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vs. Magna Water Company, 226 P. 2d 127. The matter of 
due process cannot be treated so lightly. 
Plaintiffs and respondents contend that the proceed-
ings before the district court necessarily involved the in-
troduction of evidence, and that the evidence was not only 
admissible but was essential in order that the district court 
might make proper findings, conclusions and judgments in 
each case. 
42 American Jurisprudence, Public Administrative 
Law, Section 116, sets forth the requirements of due process 
in the exercise of judicial or quasi-judicial power, which 
may be summarized as follows: 
"(a) The trier of the facts must be an impar-
tial tribunal legally constituted to determine the 
right involved. 
" (b) No findings shall be made except upon 
due notice and opportunity to be heard. 
" (c) The procedure at the hearing shall be 
consistent with the essentials of a fair trial. 
"(d) Witnesses shall be sworn on oath, ex-
amined and cross-examined, and evidence offered 
and received in accordance with recognized princi-
ples of justice. 
"(e) The hearing shall be conducted in such 
a way and appropriate findings made so that there 
will be opportunity for a court to determine whether 
the applicable rules of law and procedure were ob-
served." 
If all of the above requirements were complied with by 
the Board of County Commissioners in determining the 
j~lll 
I 
I; 
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u~!' issues of facts involved, then the contention of the appel-
lants that the hearing in district court should have been 
limited to a determination of whether or not the board 
~~. l 
•11,, 
properly applied the law to facts as found, would have sub-
stantial merit. We believe, however, that an examination 
of the nature of the proceedings taken before the Board of 
County Commissioners readily demonstrates that any hear-
ing held by that body did not meet the requirements of due 
process of law. 
A brief examination of Chapter 32 demonstrates that 
the Board of County Commissioners is not constituted a fact 
finding body in any sense of the term and is apparently not 
empowered to determine any facts. The statute simply states 
that the board shall eliminate from the proposed district any 
property which it shall determine will not be directly bene-
fited by the proposed improvements, and the determination, 
so far as the statute discloses, can be made entirely in the 
breast of the Board of County Commissioners. They are not 
required to nor did they try or determine any facts to reach 
their decision, and the resolution which the board passed 
establishing the district so demonstrates (see paragraph 4 
of the Resolution, page 7, appellants' brief, which simply 
states that all property will be directly benefited and no 
property will be eliminated). 
Respondents further contend that the hearing before 
the Board of County Commissioners was not conducted con-
sistently with the essentials of a fair trial, which requires 
that witnesses may be sworn on oath, examined and cross-
examined, and evidence offered and received in accordance 
with recognized principles of law. While the provisions of 
Section 17-5-5 U. C. A. 1953 authorize a member of the 
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Board of County Commissioners to administer oaths, no 
provisions are made in said Chapter 32 empowering the 
Board of County Commissioners to hear evidence, subpoena 
witnesses, make findings or perform any acts universally 
regarded as being essential to the conduct of a fair and 
impartial hearing for the determination of issues here in-
volved. 
A final essential requirement of due process in con-
nection with the proceedings of administrative bodies is 
that appropriate findings be made setting forth the basis 
upon which ultimate facts are found or principles of law 
applied. Paragraph 4 of the resolution creating the district 
referred to above clearly demonstrates that the Commis-
sioners neither made nor undertook to make any findings 
whatever, but on the contrary simply concluded that none 
of the property would be eliminated from the district and 
created the district without any such elimination. It is 
universally recognized that in the absence of findings by 
an administrative body nothing is presented upon which a 
court may determine whether or not the administrative body 
acted pursuant to its jurisdiction and regularly pursued its 
authority. 
The appellants' position, namely that the failure of the 
Board of County Commissioners to abide by the requisites of 
due process is attributable solely to the fault of plaintiffs 
and respondents who' should have insisted that the board fol-
low the requirements of due process, seems somewhat un-
tenable · here. Due process would indeed become purely 
ethereal if the burden of guaranteeing its requirements were 
cast upon those whom the doctrine is 'designed to protect. 
:~ 
;;Ji 
i ~ 
'( 
J ~\ 
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This is particularly true here where plaintiffs and re-
spondents were entitled to assume that the Board of County 
Commissioners correctly interpreted the extent of the 
authority conferred upon them by Chapter 32, which author-
ity manifestly falls far short of meeting the requirements of 
due process. It is therefore obvious that the Legislature, 
in enacting Chapter 32, did not intend the hearing before 
the Board of County Commissioners to be a judicial or 
quasi judicial inquiry meeting the requirements of due pro-
cess, and wisely provided in the enactment for appeal to a 
tribunal ideally constituted to determine facts and render 
due process. 
The propriety of the exercise of judicial power by the 
administrative creatures of legislatures has been the sub-
ject of discussion and litigation since the inception of 
"board government." The arguments which have persuaded 
courts that such exercise has been proper are ( 1) that the 
board in question is pecularily well qualified by training 
and experience (or will become so) to determine questions 
of fact within a special field of inquiry outside the general 
ken of the judiciary, and (2) that such exercise is neces-
sary in order to produce an efficient and effectvie admin-
istrative enforcement of the public interest in matters of 
executive character (See Re Opinion of Justices, 87 N. H. 
492, 179 A 344). 
It must have been as obvious to the legislature as it is 
to us that the County Commission is not specially qualified 
by training and experience to determine such abstruse 
questions as are here involved and will not become so by 
daily organizing new districts. The strong likelihood is 
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that this commission will never organiz~ another district 
under this act. It is apparent also that the exercise of 
judicial power by the commission is not necessary in order 
to produce an efficient enforcement of the public interest. 
The courts are readily available and well constituted to con-
sider these problems, and their calendars will not become 
cluttered with a plethera of such cases, as they would with 
tax cases or rate cases or compensation cases. 
The usual reasons for conferring judicial power on an 
executive body are simply absent here. 
I. 
I" 
Treated in the light of the principles here considered, r~ 
it seems abundantly clear that the essential requirements 
of due process were not complied with in the proceedings 
taken before the Board of County Commissioners and that 
the plaintiffs and respondents were entitled to introduce 
evidence before the district court and that that court did 
not err as alleged by the appellants. The authorities sup-
port these propositions. 
In Patterick vs. Carbon Water Conservancy District, 
145 P. 2d 503, our Supreme Court reviews the statute auth-
orizing the creation of water conservancy districts under 
the Water Conservancy Act of 1941. This act provides, 
among other things, for the taking of certain proceedings 
before the district court in connection with the organization 
of such districts. The court in concluding that the· Act 
affords due process of law observes that: 
"As we have already shown, the proceedings 
creating a Water Conservancy District is a judicial 
proceeding. The sections quoted above provide for 
notice of hearing to all persons interested. Such 
~I 
ii'iil 
I~~ 
~ 
I 
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9 
persons are given an opportunity to come into court 
and object to the creation of the district, if they so 
desire. This is the due process of law." 
The foregoing statement clearly demonstrates that an 
interested party must be given his day in court in order to 
comply with due process of law. 
In Tygeson v. Magna Water Co., 226 P. 2d 127, our 
Supreme Court considered the constitutionality of Chapter 
24, Laws of Utah 1949, which was amended by Chapter 32, 
Laws of Utah 1951, here directly involved. The court ap-
pears to take for granted the proposition that any property 
owner affected would be entitled to present facts before 
a court, for it points out that: 
"Before the district is organized any owner 
whose property may be affected and who has com-
plied with the provisions of the Act as to written 
protest may come into court and have the matter of 
whether his property will be benefited or whether 
the proceedings in establishing the· district have 
been made in compilance with the statute, reviewed 
by the court. This is due process." (Italicizing ours.) 
It is to be noted that the Court did not say that the 
record or actions of the Board could be reviewed, but clearly 
stated that the matter of whether or not his property would 
be benefited was to be reviewed by the Court. 
The case of New England T. & T. Co. v. Department of 
Public Utilities, 159 N. E. 743, 56 A. L. R. 784 (Mass.), 
further illustrates this rule. In that case, an appeal was 
taken from an order of the Massachusetts Department of 
Public Utilities. The appeal was taken to a trial court. In 
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the trial court, the telephone company undertook to prove 
certain facts by evidence. The trial judge ruled that the 
telephone company was not entitled to introduce any evi-
dence under its petition and that the case must be decided 
upon the record of the proceedings before the commission. 
The Supreme Court of Massachusetts in holding that the 
telephone company was entitled to introduce evidence in 
the proceeding before the court, stated that: 
"The law is established that, upon an appeal 
under Gen. Laws, chap. 25, section 5, the court will 
not hear evidence to review or revise findings of 
fact made by the department. No power is given to 
rehear facts, (citing cases). The parties must not 
withhold evidence from the department and produce 
it in court, (citing cases). Where, however, there 
is no finding of fact material to petitioner's right to 
review, this rule does not forbid the presentation of 
evidence to establish it. Such evidence is not of-
fered in rehearing of issues of fact decided by the 
department, but as the basis in fact to support a 
claim of right. Unless such evidence is admissable, 
the right to review given by the statute is not broad 
enough to secure due process of law, and the statute 
may be rendered unconstitutional, (citing cases). 
There must be a fair opportunity for submitting the 
issue of confiscation or undue interference with the 
right of management to a judicial tribunal for de-
termination upon its own independent judgment as 
to both law and fact, (citing cases)." 
If the respondents had been denied the right to intro-
duce evidence before the district court and denied the right 
to have appropriate findings of fact made in these cases, 
such denials would unquestionably render Chapter 32 un-
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~(}\ \Q~ constitutional. It goes without saying that the Legislature 
:u.\~1 ~: did not intend that its act would be unconstitutional, and 
()U\lc~ ~i 
m~t~ 1 
tb.ee~~ 
M~1 
tiJUUr:, 
'.,. ...... 
. ,,;...-·-' 
it therefore accordingly follows that it must necessarily 
have been the Legislative intent to afford property owners 
standing in the position of respondents the right to present 
evidence upon the issues of fact and law herein involved 
and to have such evidence passed upon and the issue de-
termined in accordance with the requirements of due 
process of law. 
The principles announced in the Massachusetts case 
are further illustrated in the case of Virginian Railway Co. 
v. System Federation No. 40 et al., 57 S. C. T. 592, 300 U. 
S. 515. That case involved a certification of representation 
of a labor union by the National Mediation Board. The cer-
tification was made as a result of an election held for the 
purpose of determining representatives for collective bar-
gaining purposes. After certification by the National Medi-
ation Board, suit was brought by the labor organization 
against the railroad company in the district court of the 
United States to compel enforcement of the certification of 
the board. In the district court, evidence was introduced 
pursuant to which the trial court found that the labor union 
was the duly authorized representative of certain of the 
employees of the railroad company. The railroad company, 
in the Supreme Court of the United States, insisted that the 
Certificate of the Mediation Board was fatally defective 
upon the ground that the findings on which it was based 
were not set forth. However, the trial court heard inde-
pendent evidence on the subject and entered its own find-
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ings. In holding that the court was entitled to hear evidence 
and make its· own findings, the Supreme Court said: 
"Whether the certification, if made as to those 
facts, is conclusive, it is unnecessary now to deter-
mine. But we think it plain that if the Board omits 
to certify any of them, the omitted fact is open to 
inquiry by the court asked to enforce the command 
of the statute, (citing cases). Such inquiry was 
made by the trial court which found the number of 
eligible voters and thus established the correctness 
of the Board's ultimate conclusion." 
In the case at bar, inasmuch as repondents actually had 
no hearing before the Board of County Commissioners of 
such character as. to meet the requirements of due process 
of law, and since no findings whatever were made, it be-
comes essential that the court hear the evidence in order to 
make appropriate findings and decisions. 
By reason and authority, it therefore appears abund-
antly clear that the district court did not err in receiving 
any material or relevant evidence in connection with these 
proceedings. 
POINT II. 
THE DISTRICT COURT PROPERLY ELIMIN-
ATED FROM THE DISTRICT THE PROPER-
TIES OF RESPONDENTS WHICH WILL NOT 
BE DIRECTLY BENEFITED BY THE PRO-
POSED IMPROVEMENTS. 
A. THE STATUTORY REQUIREMENT OF 
ELIMINATION, UPON PROTEST OF PROP-
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
13 
ERTY WHICH WILL NOT BE DIRECTLY 
BENEFITED BY THE PROPOSED IMPROVE-
MENTS IS NOT LIMITED TO THE ELIMIN-
ATION OF REAL PROPERTY. 
Though the appellants devote some space in their 
brief in support of the proposition that a district is a geo-
graphical area, this. point, we believe, can be conceded inas-
much as the act itself provides for geographical definition 
thereof. Respondents, however, take issue with appellants' 
proposition that only real property may be eliminated from 
the district. 
In this connection it should be pointed out that one of 
the strongest reasons advanced by appellants for their con-
tention is that Chapter 32 provides that only real property 
is included in the district. Beginning at the bottom of page 
32 of appellants' brief, they state as follows: 
"Now here in the action is anything said about 
including personal property in the district. In fact 
the only thing that is discussed in the act as being 
included is real property. Then when that same 
statute goes on to say what shall be eliminated under 
certain specified conditions, in the following lan-
guage: 
" 'In such resolution establishing such dis-
trict, the board of County Commissioners shall 
eliminate from said proposed qistrict any prop-
erty originally included therein, but which it 
shall determine will not be directly benefited 
by the proposed improvements.' 
it can only mean what it says, that the property 
which might be eliminated, under the conditions 
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specified, is any of the property which was orig-
inally included in the proposed district. And the 
only property which was included in the proposed 
district was real property; and hence nothing but 
real property could be eliminated from the district 
or could have been eliminated from the proposed dis-
trict in the first instance on the protest of the re-
spondents." 
Appellants maintain that any contrary view results in 
absurdities, yet respondents feel that the viewpoint ad-
vanced by appellants is itself absurd. The only reason any 
properties are included within,..a district of this type is for 
taxation purposes. If p~rsonal property is taxable, it is un-
questionably included within the district. If, as appellants 
maintain, personal property is not included within the dis-
trict, then appellants have suffered no injury by the judg-
ment of the lower court eliminating personal property. It 
should be further pointed out that the respondent railroad 
companies did request and obtain elimination of certain real 
property from the district. (Rights of way.) 
Respondents' theory is that any kind of property, real 
or personal, must be excluded from the district if it will not 
benefit directly from the improvement proposed. 
Respondents believe the legislative concept in the en-
actment of the chapter now under scrutiny was that the 
districts should be financed in part by general taxation, 
but only by the taxation of one kind of property, the kind 
which "will be directly benefited" by the installation. The 
Legislature directed the County Commissioners to elimin-
ate from the district any other kind of property by this 
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language from Section 3 of the Act: "In such resolution 
establishing such district the Board of County Commis-
sioners shall eliminate from said proposed district any prop-
erty originally included therein but which it shall determine 
will not be directly benefited by the proposed improve-
ments." 
What does the word "property" mean? 
Appellants contend in their Motion that "property" as 
used in the above quotation means "real property" only, 
but they then point up some cogent evidence to the contrary. 
The word "property" appears ten times in Sections 2 and 
3, and eight of those ten times it appears in the phrase 
"real property." Obviously, every time there was an inten-
tion to talk about real estate only, the phrase "real property" 
was used. When the intention was to talk about property in 
the broad natural sense, no limiting adjective was employed. 
The court is familiar with the rule that words in a 
Statute should be given their commonly accepted meaning. 
(See 50 Am. Jur. 228; Emmertson vs. State Tax Commis-
sion, 93 Utah 219; 72 P. (2d) 476.) The commonly under-
stood, natural, popular and recognized meaning of the word 
"property" embraces all things with respect to which legal 
relations between persons exist. In Metropolitan Trust Com-
pany vs. Jones, 51 N. E. (2d) 256, the court adopted a defin-
ition of property including "Every interest one may have 
in any and every thing that is the subject of ownership by 
man, together with the right to freely possess, enjoy and 
dispose of the same." American Jurisprudence acknowl-
edges that the general and popular understanding has been 
held to be that property includes chattels. (42 Am. Jur. 
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188.) A perusal of "Words and Phrases" reveals no case 
in which the word "property" alone has been held to mean 
real property only. 
Is there any reason to assign a restricted meaning to 
"property" in this Statute? 
To give the word "property" a narrow and restricted 
meaning in the section of Statute above quoted can be 
justified only if the application of the commonly accepted 
meaning would defeat the purpose of the Statute and in-
tent of the Legislature. Appellants must, therefore, con-
tend that the purpose of the Statute and the intent of the 
Legislature were that taxpayers in the district who owned 
no real property should have no opportunity to attack the 
procedure under which a tax will be imposed upon them 
even though they may be the source of the majority of tax 
funds. Such an unnatural and inequitable intent should be 
ascribed to the Legislature only if the Statute is reasonably 
susceptible to no other interpretation. Appellants position 
is that the Statute is reasonably susceptible to no other in-
terpretation because only real property owners may (1) 
petition for the creation of the district or (2) by petition 
defeat the creation of the district and because there are 
provisions with reference to the manner in which protests 
by real property OWI_lers should be signed. Respondents sub-
mit that the Legislature could reasonably and did intend 
that only real property owners could force the creation of 
the district but that other kinds of taxpayers could pro-
test the inclusion of their property within it. There is noth-
ing about the context of this Statute or the circumstances of 
this legislation which would justify a different construction. 
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A construction restricting exclusion to real property would 
in fact do violence to the principle that tax statutes should 
be construed in favor of the taxpayer. The Utah court ap-
proved and applied this principle in the case of Norville 
vs. State Tax Commission, 98 Utah 170; 97 P. (2d) 937. At 
page 177 the court says: "The doctrine that taxing statutes 
are, in case of doubt as to the intention of the Legislature, 
to be construed strictly against the taxing authority and in 
favor of those on whom the tax is levied, has been well set 
out in the case of (Citing cases) . 
The Utah Legislature has enacted many laws. contem-
,plating territorial exclusions from political 'Subdivisions. 
In each case language unequivocally relating to real prop-
erty has been employed. 
Some of the most persuasive evidence that the Legis-
lature intended more than a territorial exclusion in the 
quoted section of the Statute is that it has frequently en-
acted laws which would contemplate only territorial ex-
clusion, and it has always used language which left no doubt 
of its intention. For example, the water conservancy act 
which provides for the creation of "districts" for the pur-
pose of providing water for irrigation, industrial and 
domestic purposes has a provision in it authorizing the dis-
trict court which creates the district to exclude certain 
lands from the district. The section of the Statute involved 
is Section 73-9-30, Utah Code Annotated 1953. The Statute 
reads: 
"The owner or owners in fee of any lands con-
stituting a portion of the district may file with the 
board a petition praying that such lands be excluded 
and taken from said district." (Italicizing supplied.) 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
18 
In drafting t!J.at Statute, the members of the Legisla-
ture had real property in mind and had in mind geographi-
cal and area elimination, solely, and consequently they spec-
ifically so provided by using the term "lands." It is reason-
able to assume that the drafters of the water and sewer 
improvement district act were well acquainted with the 
language of the water conservancy act because of the gen-
eral similarity in purpose and nature of the type of dis-
trict contemplated. As is evidenced in the case of Tygeson 
vs. Magna Water Co., 226 P. (2d) 127, counsel for the 
Magna Water Company, an improvement district which was 
created under a 1949 version of the same act under which 
the defendant district was created, relied heavily on the 
court's treatment of the water conservancy act to establish 
the constitutionality of the water and sewer improvement 
district act. The constitutionality of the water conservancy 
act was adjudicated in the case of Patterick vs. Carbon 
Water Conservancy District, 145 P. (2d) 503. The two acts 
involve very similar constitutional law problems, and so 
the writer repeats that, in all likelihood, the drafters of the 
law being construed in this action were well acquainted 
with the language used in the water conservancy act. They 
undoubtedly took note of the use of the term "lands" in the 
water conservancy act and, instead of repeating that term 
in drafting the improvement district statute, they used the 
term "property." Such a fact indicates that the intention 
of the drafters and the intention of the State Legislature 
was that the term ''property" should include all types of 
property and not merely "lands." 
It is also of significance to note that the drainage dis-
trict statute, Section 19-1-5, Utah Code Annotated 1953, 
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the language of which should also have been well known 
to the drafters of the water and sewer improvement district 
act, provides as follows : 
"Provided that any person whose lands will not, 
in the opinion of said board, be benefited by drain-
age by said system, may have such lands excluded 
from such district upon application to said board, 
* * *'; (Italicizing supplied.) 
An additional example is provided by the Statutes of 
the State of Utah relative to disconnection of territory 
from an incorporated city or town. This Statute (10-4-1 
Utah Code Annotated 1953) provides that land owners 
desiring to disconnect territory from the incorporated lim-
its of a city or town may do so by filing a petition in the 
District Court setting forth the reason for the disconnec-
tio:r~ and accompanied by a map or plat of the territory 
sought to be disconnected. This, again, is an example of 
legislative intent to provide for disconnection of territory 
or geographical and area elimination as opposed to elimina-
tion of all types of property as is provided in the Statute 
here under consideration. (Italicizing supplied.) 
There is precedent in Utah for stautory elimination 
of classes of prope;ty other than real property from a tax-
ing district. 
Exclusion, exemption or elimination of types of prop-
erty other than real property from taxation or assessment 
is not unknown to general law or to Utah law. In 51 Am. 
Jur., Sec. 501, page 506, under the subject of Taxation and 
Legislative Power, it is stated: 
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"It is inherent in the exercise of the power to 
tax that the sovereign state be free to select the 
subjects of taxation and to grant exemptions there-
from, and unless restrained by some particular pro-
vision of the state constitution the legislature has 
full power to exempt any person or corporation or 
class of property from taxation, according to its 
views of public policy and expediency." (Italicizing 
supplied.) 
Utah's water conservancy district act provides an ex-
ample of elimination of property from assessment and tax-
ation on a basis other than that of geographic or area con-
siderations. Section 73-9-24, Utah Code Annotated 1953, 
which is part of the water conservancy act, reads as fol-
lows: 
"All property of whatever kind and nature 
owned by the state and by towns, cities, school dis-
tricts, drainage districts, metropolitan water dis-
tricts, irrigation districts, park districts, water dis-
tricts or any other governmental agency or agencies 
within the said district shall be exempt from assess-
ment and levy by the board as provided by this act 
for the purposes herein contained." (Italicizing sup-
plied.) 
Consequently, eliminating or exempting property with-
in the boundaries of a district of "whatever kind an nature" 
from assessment and levy is nothing new to Utah law. 
Appellants may argue that, inasmuch as the Supreme 
Court of the State of Utah (Tygeson vs. Magna Water Co., 
supra), has adjudicated that the tax involved in this district 
is a general tax and not a special assessment, that the tax 
must be imposed upon all property within the boundaries of 
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the district, with the assessment based upon the value of the 
property. Such an argument has no foundation. The water 
conservancy act language quoted in the previous subpara-
graph provides an instance in which the State provides for 
a general tax but, at the same time, eliminates from the 
imposition of that tax certain classes of property located 
within the boundaries of the district. 
A general tax is one which is imposed uniformly on 
property, with the assessment based upon the value of the 
property. Special assessment is a "tax" in which the as-
sessment is based upon the degree of benefit provided the 
various properties upon which the assessment is imposed. 
Examples of special assessments are those where assess-
ments for an irrigation district are determined by the num-
ber of acres of land owned by a property owner, or the 
number of acre feet of water allotted to an owner's lands. 
Another example of a special assessment is that imposed 
upon the basis of the number of front feet which an owner 
of land may have abutting on a street improvement. It is 
true that the Statute to be construed in this action imposes 
a general tax because it imposes a tax based upon the value 
of all of the property which is included within and not 
eliminated from the sewer district. The tax is not assessed, 
for example, on the basis of the number of sewer connec-
tions which an owner of property may have. However, the 
Statute provides for the elimination from any taxation 
property which is not "directly benefited" by the proposed 
improvement. In other words, this Statute provides for a 
general tax upon all property within the sewer district 
which is directly benefited, assessed uniformly upon the 
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value of the property which is directly benefited. Conse-
quently, there is nothing inconsistent about acknowledging 
that a general tax is contemplated by this Statute, and, at 
the same time, concluding that . certain types of property 
are to be exempted and eliminated entirely from taxation. 
Some of the properties eliminated from the district 
by the lower court consisted of real properties of the various 
respondent railroads. Appellants do not contend that the 
elimination· of such real properties from the district con-
stituted error by the lower court. 
Even appellants have proceeded as if the Commission 
had authority to exclude personal property. 
It is significant that the Weber County Commission . 
apparently proceeded on the theory that property other 
than real property could be excluded in that they defined 
the district in other than geographical terms so as to in-
clude personal property. In its Resolution of March 3, 1953, 
the Commission declared "that the boundaries of said dis-
trict are defined as follows, and all area and property lying 
within these described bounds is now within and henceforth 
a part of this sewer district:" The words of this Resolution 
can only be interpreted to express an intent that all real, 
personal and mixed property within the boundaries de-
scribed should be a part of the district. Since the property 
respondents seek to exclude was included by definition they 
could reasonably seek its exclusion by the statutory pro-
cedure provided. 
There is further reason why respondents feel the Board 
had statutory authority to exclude personal property. If 
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only real property directly benefited could be included in 
the district, then the Commission could properly define the 
district only on the basis of evidence of the specific installa-
tion the district proposed. Hereafter in this brief it will 
be demonstrated that property is directly benefited by a 
sewer only if it is connected or capable of direct connection. 
A Commission could decide what real property could be 
directly connected to a proposed sewer only if it had before 
it a map or detailed description showing exactly where the 
lines would be laid. Since the district has made no concrete 
plans, the Commission could not have had such evidence 
before it. It must, therefore, have proceeded on the theory 
that the exclusion intended was the exclusion of the kinds 
. of property which by their nature are incapable of connec-
tion to a sewer. These are exactly the kinds of property 
which respondents seek to exclude. 
In summary it should be pointed out that nowhere in 
appellants' brief do they attempt or undertake to show that 
the property eliminated from the district by the trial court 
was or would have been direcly benefited by the sewer 
facility proposed, and appellants do not undertake to apprise 
the court of what constitutes a direct benefit. This par-
ticular matter will be discussed by respondents later in this 
brief. 
POINT II B. 
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY CONSID-
ERED THE PHRASE "DIRECTLY BENE-
FITED" AS THAT PHRASE APPEARS IN 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
24 
THE 1951 ACT, AND PROPERLY DENIED AP-
PELLANTS' MOTION TO STRIKE THE WORD 
"DIRECTLY" FROM RESPONDENTS' PLEAD-
INGS. 
In the lower court the appellants moved for an order 
striking from the pleadings of plaintiffs and respondents 
the word "directly" wherever that word was used or com-
bined with the word "benefited" in the phrase "directly 
benefited" on the ground that the Legislature, after passing 
Chapter 32, Laws of Utah 1951, later amended that Act 
by eliminating the word "directly" from the phrase "di-
rectly benefited" as that phrase related to property to be 
eliminated from the district. In their brief appellants cite 
the 1947 Act, the 1949 Act, the 1951 Act, and the 1953 Act 
and point out that only in the 1951 Act does the word "di-
rectly" appear before the word "benefited" where the Act 
refers to the type of property which must be eliminated 
upon protest from the district. Appellants then argue that 
obviously the word "directly" must have been inserted in 
the 1951 Act by mistake, inadvertence or some other reason, 
but certainly not by intention of the Legislature. The trial 
court had little difficulty with this contention. Appellants, 
of course, must concede that their district was organized 
under the 1951 Act and not under any other Act, and re-
spondents do not believe that appellants can seriously sup-
port their motion to strike with the simple statement that 
they believe the Legislature erred in inserting the word "di-
rectly" in the 1951 Act. What obviously happened was that 
the 1951 Act, as proposed before that Legislature, was 
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amended during the regular session in one particular only, 
and that was simply to add the word "directly" before the 
word "benefited" in the Act. This fact is plainly shown 
by the House Journal for the 29th Regular Session of the 
Legislature of the State of Utah and was further stipulated 
to by the appellants in the various stipulations entered into 
herein and now a part of the file in these cases (see para-
graph No. 4, appelants' brief, page 11). In view of the 
foregoing legislative history, it seems ridiculous for the 
appellants to argue that the word "directly" crept into the 
Act by inadvertence or accident. 
POINT II C. 
THE FINDING OF THE DISTRICT COURT 
THAT THE PROPERTY WILL NOT BE DI-
RECTLY BENEFITED BY THE PROPOSED 
IMPROVEMENTS IS SUPPORTED BY THE 
UNDISPUTED EVIDENCE. 
As previously pointed out, the appelants nowhere in 
their brief allege or cite authority for the proposition that 
the properties excluded in these cases by the trial court 
are or could be directly benefited by the proposed sewer 
facility. The appellants' brief seems to concede the fact 
that the property eliminated from the district by the lower 
court is not and could not be directly benefited by the pro-
posed sewer. In addition appellants have stipulated with 
each of the respondents as follows: 
* 
"That none of the property of the (respondents) 
* * sought to be eliminated from said district 
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in this Act is presently physically connected to any 
sewage facility, and in the conduction of (respon-
dents) operations it is not desirable or feasible to 
make a physical connection of any of such property 
to any sewage facilities." 
Inasmuch as the Legislature specifically and inten-
tionally inserted the phrase "directly benefited" in the 1951 
Act, respondents feel the court should have the benefit of 
authorities defining this phrase. 
The Property whick Respondents seek to have Elim-
inated from the District will not be Directly Benefited by 
the Proposed Improvements. 
The only Utah case which the writer has been able to 
find in which the term "direct benefits" is treated is the 
case of Hatch vs. Edwards, 269 P. 138, and in that case 
some light is shed upon the court's understanding of the 
term "directly benefited." This case is not of value in this 
action except as it throws enlightenment upon the court's 
definition of that term. In other respects the case is not 
analagous. 
That case involved the Cache County Water Conser-
vation District, an irrigation district which was organized 
under Chapter 68, Laws of Utah 1919, as amended by Chap-
ter 73, Laws of Utah 1921. This law provided for the crea-
tion of irrigation districts and for special assessments, and 
the statute said: 
"Assessments are to be made on the basis of 
value per acre foot of water allotted to the lands 
within the district." 
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The statute further provided that an allotment of water 
should be made to each 40-acre tract or smaller tract in 
separate ownership and that the final allotment would be 
on that basis for all assessments, tolls and charges levied 
against the land. The allotments were made by the board 
of directors of the district. The plaintiff in this case was 
complaining because he claimed that water had been allotted 
to 30 acres of his land but that 40 acres were being assessed. 
The minutes of the directors provided for an allotment of 
60 acre feet of water to a 40-acre tract, but the minutes 
contained this further notation, "10 acres no allotment, wet, 
30 acres, 2 acre feet per acre, total allotment 60 acre feet." 
No change, however, was made in the description of the 
40-acre tract of land in the record book of allotments, and 
the entire 40-acre tract was subjected to assessment. The 
court held that the assessor was justified in relying upon 
the record of allotments and that it had been proper, there-
fore, to assess the entire 40-acre tract. The ruling of the 
court in this case is not pertinent to this action but the 
writer is interested in pointing out the language of the 
court in its opinion with regard to the subject of direct 
benefit. The pertinent language of the court is as follows: 
"The contention of appellants is that from the 
records referred to it conclusively appears that 10 
acres of the land referred to was not benefited by 
irrigation, and could not be subjected to assessments 
for the purpose of the district, and that the pro-
ceedings resulting in the subsequent sale of the 40-
acre tract were void, because there was a sale of 10 
acres of land not benefited by the improvement, and 
the 30 acres which were benefited and subject to 
assessment were not described. In support of this 
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contention, if is argued that assessments for im-
provements of this kind must correspond to the ben-
efits resulting to the land assessed, and that an as-
sessment of property which is not benefited is void. 
This general principle is indisputable. But in ap-
plying it to a particular case it is not essential that 
every part of the property subjected to the assess-
ment shall be directly benefited by the improvement. 
It is not only competent but necessary to classify 
property into units for the purpose of estimating 
benefits, and, unless the classification is arbitrary 
or unreasonable, the owner may not defeat the as-
sessment by showing that some particular part of 
the unit assessed is not directly benefited. * * *" 
(Italicizing supplied.) 
The supreme court acknowledged that the land to which 
no allotment of water was made was not directly benefited. 
It appears reasonable to the writer that a court which will 
say that land is not directly benefited because irrigation 
water is not allotted to it and will not flow over it when 
water is allotted to and will flow over adjacent land, could 
and would consistently also hold that property which cannot 
be attached or connected to a sewer is not directly benefited, 
though property adjacent to it or used in connection with 
it is directly benefited. 
In the case of Ferguson, et al. vs. Borough of Stamford, 
(Connecticut), 22 A. 782, page 787, the court made some 
contribution to the· definition of the term "direct benefits" 
in the following language: 
"The word 'benefits' when used unqualifiedly, 
is a comprehensive term, including direct or special 
benefits, and indirect or general. But when the con-
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nection in which it is used, and the subject matter 
to which it is applied, are such as to indicate that 
it is used in a limited or qualified sense, it is the 
duty of the court to give it that interpretation. It 
is used here in the charter of the borough. In the 
ninth section of the charter of 1854 it is qualified 
by the use of the adverb 'specially'. In the act of 
1881 the adverb is dropped. But it is apparent that 
it is used in the same sense, and signifies special and 
direct benefits. This will appear more clearly, per-
haps, from a consideration of the subject matter. 
It is used with reference to an improvement under-
taken by the community for the general benefit of 
the community, but it results in a direct benefit to 
those who have immediate access to the sewer, a 
benefit in which those more remotely connected with 
it do not participate." (Italicizing supplied.) 
The appellants cite the case of Morton Salt Company 
vs. City of South Hutchinson, 159 F. 2d 897, lOth Circuit 
Court of Appeals, 1947, as authority for the proposition 
that it is no constitutional defense to a tax that the tax-
payer is not directfy benefited thereby. Respondents feel 
that this point raised by appellants has no bearing what-
soever on the case at bar since we are not concerned with 
a constitutional defense to a general taxing statute but are 
relying upon a statutory right to have eliminated from the 
district property which is not directly benefited. As a mat-
ter of fact the Morton Salt Company case is excellent au-
thority defining the meaning of the term "direct benefit", 
for the court states: 
"The benefit conferred may be direct and tang-
ible, such as * * * water or sewer line to the 
taxpayer's door, or it may be indirect and intangible, 
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such as a water works or sewer system which, al-
though not available to the taxpayer, nevertheless 
redounds to the benefit of the whole community of 
which he is a part." 
In that case the federal court referred to the case of 
Thomas vs. Kansas City Southern R. Co., 261 U. S. 481, a 
case which had arisen in Arkansas and which involved the 
assessment of railroad right of way to assist in financing 
a road improvement. In that case the Supreme Court of the 
United States determined that the assessment against the 
railroad property was discriminatory inasmuch as it was 
on a basis inequitably different from the special assessment 
on other property within the road improvement district. 
The federal court in the Morton Salt Company case analyzed 
this supreme court decision and stated: 
"that the supreme court unanimously nullified (the) 
assessment on the property of a railroad company 
on the grounds that no direct benefits were con-
ferred, and the indirect benefits, if any, were so 
completely disproportionate and remote as to be 
grossly discriminatory. * * *" 
The United States Supreme Court itself in that case, 
found in 261 U. S. 481, stated: 
"It is doubtful whether any very substantial 
appreciation in value of the railroad property within 
the district will result from the improvements; and 
very clearly it cannot be taxed upon some fanciful 
view of future earnings and distributed values, 
* * * " 
Inasmuch as there are few, if any, cases involving a 
general tax where the meaning of the words "direct benefit" 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
31 
is adjudicated, it is necessary to refer to special assessment 
cases where the meaning of the term "benefit" is frequently 
adjudicated and the meaning of the term "direct benefits" 
has been elucidated in a few instances. In their brief, ap-
pellants do not claim that the property eliminated by the 
lower court is or could be directly benefited because they 
realize that to establish such direct benefits they must rely 
entirely upon such indirect benefits as might accrue to the 
respondents by virtue of the general benefit which will ac-
crue to the community as a result of the proposed sewer 
improvements, and that improvement of the community will 
result in increased future earnings to the respondents. It 
appears to the writer that the language of the United States 
Supreme Court quoted above is very persuasive to demon-
strate that in legal contemplation such benefits are not 
direct benefits, for that court denounces the "fanciful view" 
that "future earnings and distributed values" are direct 
benefits. 
InN ew York Bay R. Co. vs. City of Newark, 83 A. 962, 
the question arose as to whether or not a railroad right of 
way was benefited by the paving of a street which was ad-
jacent to the railroad right of way. The Court said: 
"The rule, therefore, with respect to assess-
ments for local improvements is that the right of 
way of a railroad company, being in legal contem-
plation land used for railroad purposes, cannot be 
assessed upon the basis either of the general or spe-
cial enhancement of its market value, but only for 
actual benefit to such land for the public uses for 
which it was acquired." (Italicizing supplied.) 
In the case of Lehigh Valley R. Co. of New Jersey, et al. 
vs. Mayor of Jersey City, 80 A. 228, a railroad company 
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had its right of way through a marshy district and also 
owned certain lots therein which it used for railroad pur-
poses. Its tracks were upon high trestles. A sewer was put 
through the marsh. The court held that, as to the right of 
way, the railroad was not liable for any assessment having 
received no benefit, but as to the other property if not used 
for railroad purposes it was liable to assessments the same 
as any other property, but if used it was liable only to the 
amount of the benefits. The court's actual language is as 
follows: 
"As the matter goes back for reassessment it 
is proper to deal with the special points made by 
individual prosecutors. The railroad company claims 
that it should not be assessed at all, and we think 
that, as to its right of way strip, this claim is well 
founded. Its railroad runs on a high trestle resting 
on stone or concrete piers built in the marsh, and 
by dumping from the trestle an embankment may 
be gradually substituted. In any case the question 
of drainage is quite immaterial to the railroad com-
pany. If the trestle stood in a pond it would make 
no difference to it. There is manifestly no benefit 
to this property for the purposes for which it is 
used. And this is the test in such case. (Cases 
cited.) But the railroad owns besides the right of 
way, over 60 city lots, some adjoining the right of 
way strip, some disconnected from it. It does not 
appear whether these lands are used in whole or 
part for railroad purposes. If not so used they a~e 
assessable like any other lands; if so used, and If 
benefited for such purposes by the sewer, they are 
assessable, not to the extent of enhancement of 
market value but to the extent of benefit for rail-
road purposes. * * *" 
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In the case of City of Lincoln vs. Chicago & A. R. Co., 
104 N. E. 277, the question again arose as to whether or 
not the right of way of a railroad was benefited by stre.et 
improvement. The court went into considerable detail to 
say that the determination of benefits must be based upon 
the benefit to the property in its particular use and con-
cluded that, based on that standard, the right of way was 
not benefited. Excerpts from the opinion of the court are 
as follows: 
"Counsel for the appellant insist that the evi-
dence on the question of benefits, on the hearing 
before the jury, should have been restricted to the 
market value of the property limited to railroad 
purposes; while counsel for the appellee argue that 
the measure of benefits for this improvement was 
the enhanced value of the property by reason of the 
pavement for any purpose for which the property 
could be used, without regard to its being restricted 
to railroad purposes. Cases have arisen in this and 
other jurisdictions in which the improvement would 
confer a special benefit upon the property assessed 
if it were used for ordinary purposes, but when used 
for the special and peculiar purpose the improvement 
conferred no special benefit upon the property while 
devoted to such special use * * * 
"* * * Where the property is restricted by 
statute or grant to a particular use, and cannot be 
legally applied to any other use, and is at the time 
of the improvement devoted to such particular use, 
the true measure of the benefit which the improve-
ment will confer is the increased value for the re-
stricted use, in the absence of proof reasonably 
tending to show that the property in question, hav-
ing regard to present conditions and the existing 
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business and wants of the public, is about to be 
devoted to other uses. * * * 
"* * * 'The question, then, here must be, 
in the absence of proof tending to show that the 
property in question is devoted to other than right 
of way purposes, or is about to be so devoted, will 
it, for the purposes of right of way for the two 
tracks of appellee, be benefited by the improvement 
of the street upon which it borders? It must be 
borne in mind that railroad right of way cannot be 
put upon the market by a railroad company for 
general business purposes, as can private property.' 
"* * * Under these rules it is clear that any 
evidence as to benefits that might be taken concern-
ing the 100-foot strip of right of way included in 
the assessment should be restricted to the special 
and peculiar use for which the property was thus 
devoted. * * *" 
The New Jersey and Illinois cases cited above place 
considerable emphasis upon the factor that those attempting 
to prove benefit to a railroad right of way must show that 
the benefit is to the property in its use as a right of way. 
It is clear that the proposed improvements of the appellant 
district in this case will not render the railroads' right of 
way, or the transmission lines or rails located thereon, or 
the rolling stock, any more beneficial to the railroads for 
railroad purposes or the property of the other parties re-
spondents any more beneficial to said respondents for the 
purposes for which said properties are used. Under the rul-
ings of the New Jersey and Illinois cases it is adjudicated 
that there is no "benefit," let alone no "direct benefit." 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
35 
Dillon on Municipal Corporations, at page 2619, cites 
the New York case of People vs. Kingston, 53 N. Y. App. 
Div. 58, and states as follows: 
"\Vhere the authority conferred vras to assess 
the cost of a sewer 'against the property immed-
iately benefited thereby' it was held that an assess-
ment could not be made on property on a parallel 
street which could only be connected with the sewer 
by the construction of a connecting sewer 350 feet 
long." 
Dillon, on the same page, refers to several New Jersey 
cases, including Kellogg vs. Elizabeth, 40 N. J. Law 274, 
and states as follows : 
"In New Jersey it was held by the supreme 
court that the special and peculiar benefit justify-
ing a sewer assessment is a present benefit immed-
iately accruing from the construction of the work, 
and that intended benefits which may never be re-
alized were not sufficient, mere speculative benefit 
not being a benefit which can be recognized. Hence 
it was held that the land which cannot be drained 
into a trunk sewer until connecting laterals are 
built cannot be assessed for the cost of the trunk 
sewer until the laterals are constructed." 
In 37 A. L. R., at page 249, the editors refer to a per-
tinent New Jersey case with the following language : 
"* * * New Jersey, R. & Transp. Co., Pros-
ecutor, v. Elizabeth (1875) 37 N. J. L. 330, it was 
contended that a railroad right of way was a public 
highway, and, therefore, not liable to assessment 
for sewer improvements. In answer the court states: 
'The premises are the property of the company and 
are owned and used by it for the emolument of the 
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company and its stockholders. The drainage of land 
devoted to that purpose, and so used, by the con-
struction of sewers, may be a direct benefit to it 
in the use to which the lands are appropriated, in 
making more solid the foundation of the roadbed 
and relieving it from the flow of surface water. 
Benefits accruing in this manner from the construc-
tion of a public improvement are of a character that 
will justify the laying of assessments for the cost 
and expenses thereof within the limit of the bene-
fits conferred.' It was held, however, in that case, 
that the fact that the nearest point of location of 
the sewer improvement to the right of way was one-
half mile, without any connection therewith, showed 
that the sewer in its present condition was of no 
benefit to the right of way, and that, therefore, the 
right of way was not liable for the assessment, even 
though there was a possibility that in the future 
another sewer would be constructed to connect the 
right of way with the existing one." 
The facts stipulated in the case at bar reveal that no 
drainage is contemplated and that it is not feasible or de-
sirable that the sewer be connected to any of the properties 
described in respondents protests. In 37 A. L. R. 261, the 
editors refer to a Connecticut case with the following 
language: 
"Property of a railroad company purchased for 
the purpose of storing freight cars and, so far as 
used, used exclusively for that purpose, the greater 
portion of which is wholly unoccupied, which. is 
eligibly situated for mechanical and manufactunng 
purposes, and for such purposes would be especially 
benefited by a sewer, is liable for a sewer assess-
ment. New York, N. H. & H. R. Co. v. New Britain 
(1881) 49 Conn. 40. The intimation is, however, 
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that had the land been permanently dedicated to 
railroad purposes, such as a right of way for its 
through line, it would not have been liable, prob-
ably on the theory that no benefit could have ac-
crued. * * *" 
The language contained in the "intimation" above is 
applicable to the case at bar because the properties which 
the respondent railroads are attempting to have eliminated 
from the district are properties which are permanently dedi-
cated to railroad purposes. 
What has been said with reference to railroad rights 
of way applies a fortiari to the interests and properties of 
the respondent utilities. The cases establish without dissent 
that a "direct benefit" is at least of equal magnitude with 
the "special benefit" necessary to support a special assess-
ment. The described properties of respondent utilities cer-
tainly do not derive such benefit from an improvement dis-
trict that they can be specially assessed. 
"The equipment and fixtures in the street, used 
by public service corporations, and the rights and 
privileges and franchises enjoyed by them, which 
have been availed of for the purpose of placing this 
kind of property in the street, is not subject to as-
sessment for public improvements, such as street 
improvements." (Citing cases.) McQuillan-Munic-
ipal Corporations, 3rd Edition, Volume 14, Section 
38.77, page 205. 
Such property therefore does not benefit directly, con-
sequently it can not properly be included in a district 
organized under this statute. 
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In conclusion, the only evidence before the trial court 
consisted of the stipulations on file herein that none of the 
properties eliminated by the lower court could be physically 
connected to the sewer facility proposed, and that such a 
connection would not be desirable or feasible, and all of 
the case authority is that there can be no direct benefit from 
a sewer facility to property which is not and cannot be 
directly connected to the facility. It follows, then, that none 
of the property excluded could be directly benefited because 
none of that property could be directly connected, and 
as a consequence there was ample evidence before the trial 
court to support the judgments rendered herein. 
CONCLUSION 
In conclusion respondents submit that the trial court 
did not err as contended by appellants and that the judg-
ments rendered by that trial court should be upheld and 
affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
S. N. CORNWALL, of VanCott, 
Bagley, Cornwall & McCarthy, 
Attorneys for the Denver & Rio 
Grande Western Railroad Com-
pany and the Mountain States 
Telephone and Telegraph Com-
pany, 
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FRANK ALLEN, of Irvine, Ovard 
and Allen, Attorneys for Utah 
Power and Light Company, 
WOOD R. WORSLEY, of Skeen, 
Thurman, Worsley & Snow, At-
torneys for the Bamberger Rail-
road Company and the Lake 
Shore Transportation Company, 
MARVIN J. BERTOCH, of Lever-
ich, Bronson, Miner, Coray & 
Bertoch, and ALBERT R. BOW-
EN, of Ray, Quinney, & Nebe-
ker, Attorneys for Southern Pa-
cific Company, Union Pacific 
Railroad Co., Oregon Short Line 
Railroad Co. and the Ogden Un-
ion Railway & Depot Co., 
B. Z. KASTLER, JR. and RAY, 
RAWLINS, JONES & HEN-
DERSON, Attorneys for Moun-
tain Fuel Supply Company. 
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